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Abstract—With the increasing popularity of blockchain tech-
nologies in recent years, blockchain-based decentralized applica-
tions (DApps for short in this paper) have been rapidly developed
and widely adopted in many areas, being a hot topic in both
academia and industry. Despite of the importance of DApps,
we still have quite little understanding of DApps along with its
ecosystem. To bridge the knowledge gap, this paper presents the
first comprehensive empirical study of blockchain-based DApps
to date, based on an extensive dataset of 995 Ethereum DApps
and 29,846,075 transaction logs over them. We make a descriptive
analysis of the popularity of DApps, summarize the patterns
of how DApps use smart contracts to access the underlying
blockchain, and explore the worth-addressing issues of deploying
and operating DApps. Based on the findings, we propose some
implications for DApp users to select proper DApps, for DApp
developers to improve the efficiency of DApps, and for blockchain
vendors to enhance the support of DApps.
Index Terms—decentralized applications, Ethereum, smart
contract, empirical study
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the invention of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin by Satoshi
Nakamoto in 2008 [4], blockchain technologies have been
rapidly developed, and have drawn lots of attentions from
both academia and industry. A blockchain is a decentralized,
distributed, and public digital ledger that is used to record
transactions across many nodes so that any involved record
cannot be altered retroactively, without the alteration of all
subsequent blocks. Due to its advantages of decentralization,
immutability, security, and transparency, the blockchain has
become one of the most promising infrastructural technologies
for the next generation of Internet-based systems, such as
public services, Internet of Things (IoT), reputation systems,
and security services [41].
Essentially, the blockchain is a kind of distributed sys-
tems, providing the computation capability for applications
to run on multiple computation nodes. Since blockchains
have no centralized control but are maintained according to
decentralized consensus models, applications on blockchains
actually belong to decentralized applications (DApp for short),
a special type of software where the application execution is
not controlled by a single entity. In history, DApps usually
refer to applications that run on the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network
of computers rather than a single centralized computer. Many
famous DApps have ever been developed and widely spread,
such as BitTorrent [5] for file sharing, BitMessage [6] for
instant messaging, and Popcorn Time [7] for video streaming.
Blockchains provide a general computation abstraction via
the mechanism of smart contracts, making it easy to develop
DApps for various application contexts. For example, the
Ethereum blockchain [29] provides Turing-complete smart
contracts for developers to implement general-purpose pro-
grams. In consequence, with the prosperity of blockchains,
more and more blockchain-based DApps have emerged, being
adopted to almost all areas. According to a recent report, the
value of the biggest blockchain-based DApp market, Ethereum
DApp market, has reached billions of dollars as of Jan. 2019
[1].
Despite of the popularity of blockchain-based DApps, there
is no comprehensive understanding of such a rising ecosystem.
The industrial reports on blockchain-based DApps focus on
only basic usage statistics [2], [68], such as the number of
daily active users and the amount of transactions. Academic re-
search efforts are mainly devoted on the underlying blockchain
system [37], [38], [42] as well as the mechanism of smart
contracts [40], [50]. Few studies investigate the characteristics
and development practices of blockchain-based DApps.
To bridge the knowledge gap, in this paper, we conduct
the first comprehensive empirical study on blockchain-based
DApps. We choose Ethereum, the largest and the most popular
platform for running blockchain-based DApps, as our target.
We select 995 popular Ethereum DApps, which contain 5,158
smart contracts, and retrieve all the corresponding 29,846,075
transactions occurred in 2018. Based on the dataset, we try
to answer the following three research questions:
• RQ1: How is the popularity of DApps distributed?
We explore the popularity of DApps by the number
of unique users, transactions, and transaction volumes,
and compare categories of DApps. We also examine
the change of popularity as time evolves. By answering
this question, we can provide an overview of the DApp
market for all stakeholders in the DApp ecosystem.
• RQ2: Are there any common practices of developing
DApps? We investigate whether DApps are open source
and how smart contracts are organized in a DApp. By
answering this question, we can reveal the development
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practices of current DApps.
• RQ3: How much is the cost of DApps when running
on the blockchain? Running DApps have to pay fee
to blockchain miners for deploying and executing smart
contracts. By answering this question, we can provide
some recommendations for developers to reduce the cost
of DApps.
Our key findings are summarized as follows:
• Popularity of DApps (Sections IV-A & IV-B). The
distributions of the number of users, transactions, and
transaction volumes against the popularity of DApps
typically follow the Pareto principle, i.e., a few DApps
have substantial popularity. DApps with financial features
have large influence on the market.
• Growth of DApps (Section IV-C). The number of
DApps was first rapidly grown for the categories
including Exchanges, Gambling, and Finance. As more
DApps are developed, the number of DApps from the
high-risk category increases significantly, leading to
potential security issues.
• Open source of DApps (Section V-A). Currently, the
open-source levels of DApps are a bit diverse and not
satisfactory. Only 15.7% of DApps are fully open source
where the code of both the DApp and related smart
contracts are available. In contrast, 25.0% of DApps
are completely closed source. In general, DApps whose
smart contracts are open source, usually have more
transactions than others, indicating that open source can
have potentially significant impacts on the popularity of
DApps.
• Usage patterns of smart contracts (Section V-B).
75% of DApps consist of only one smart contract. For
DApps with multiple smart contracts, there are 3 usage
patterns of smart contracts: leader-member where smart
contracts are invoked with each other through internal
transactions, equivalent where there is no invocation
between smart contracts, and factory where the child
contracts are deployed by a factory contract.
• Cost of deploying smart contracts (Section VI-A).
The average deployment cost per smart contract for
single-contract DApps is less than that for multi-contract
DApps. The deployment cost per smart contract is
correlated with the line of code (LoC) and the number
of functions (NoF) where NoF has more influence on
the deployment cost.
• Cost of executing smart contracts (Section VI-B). In the
median case, only 50% of the prepaid fee for executing
smart contracts is actually used, leading to half of the
prepaid fee being locked in transactions until they are
confirmed. Contract executions with internal transactions
cost more than those without internal transactions.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first com-
prehensive analysis of blockchain-based DApps to date. Our
findings present an overview of Ethereum DApp market,
motivating future research and development. Specifically, the
findings show strong implications for multiple stakeholders of
the market. For example, end-users can choose suitable DApps
according to DApp distribution; end-users and developers can
set proper amount of prepaid fee for executing smart contracts
to avoid their assets being locked during contract executions;
DApp developers can understand DApp life cycle better and
use the suitable pattern to design the DApp architecture
and smart contracts; blockchain vendors can optimize some
mechanisms to serve DApps better.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the background of the Ethereum blockchain and
Ethereum DApps in Section II. We describe our dataset in
Section III. We characterize the DApp popularity in Section
IV, analyze features in the development of DApps in Section
V, and investigate the cost of deploying and executing DApps
in Section VI. We summarize our findings and implications
in Section VII. We survey related work in Section VIII, and
conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
We choose the largest DApp market, Ethereum DApps, to
conduct our empirical study. In this section, we give some
background knowledge of the Ethereum blockchain and the
Ethereum DApps.
A. Ethereum Blockchain
The blockchain is a ledger system based on a P2P network,
keeping records of transactions which represent value transfers
between accounts. In the network, all nodes receive transac-
tions, pack them into a block that is linked to the previous
block, and broadcast the block. According to the consensus
mechanism, if most nodes receive and accept a block, then
the block will be a part of the ledger.
Ethereum is the second-generation blockchain after Bitcoin.
The ledger of Ethereum is used to support the cryptocurrency,
Ether (ETH).
In Ethereum, there are two kinds of accounts: user ac-
counts and smart-contract accounts. The user accounts rep-
resent participants, including callers (who call functions of
smart contracts), deployers (who deploy smart contracts on
Ethereum), and miners (whose nodes work to do contribution
to the ledger). The smart-contract accounts represent the smart
contract which is a type of programs that are saved in and able
to run on blockchains, called chaincode (code on chain) as well
[33], [34]. Ethereum is the first blockchain providing Turing-
complete programming language to develop smart contracts.
Transactions can be classified from two dimensions:
On the one hand, according to the data in the transaction,
transactions can be divided into Ether transfers and contract
executions. An Ether transfer represents that a user account
transfers some Ether to another one. A contract execution
represents that an account calls a function of a smart contract
with some data as the input and some Ether as the fee for
executing the contract.
On the other hand, according to the transaction initiator,
transactions can be divided into external transactions which
are initiated by user accounts, and internal transactions which
are initiated by smart contract accounts.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the two classifica-
tions. If the target account of a transaction is a user account,
the transaction belongs to Ether transfer. If the target account
of a transaction is a smart-contract account, the transaction
belongs to contract execution.
User 
Account 1
Smart 
Contract A
Smart 
Contract B
User 
Account 2
External Transaction
Ether Transfer
External Transaction
Contract Execution
Internal Transaction
Ether Transfer
Internal Transaction
Contract Execution
Fig. 1: Relationship between the two classifications of trans-
actions.
Accounts have to pay fee for all transactions. These fees
are uniformly called gas in the Ethereum ecosystem.
B. Ethereum DApp
Ethereum blockchain provides computation and storage
capabilities via the mechanism of smart contracts. Therefore,
Ethereum DApps can deploy smart contracts to use the capa-
bilities provided by Ethereum to implement business logics.
In theory, all the processes and data of a blockchain-based
DApp should be handled and stored on the blockchain for pure
decentralization. However, due to the performance bottleneck
of state-of-the-art blockchain systems, current DApps usually
implement only parts of their functionality on the blockchain.
As a result, three kinds of architectures are adopted by
Ethereum DApps in practice as shown in Figure 2: direct,
indirect and mixed. For DApps of the direct architecture
(Figure 2a), the client directly interacts with smart contracts
deployed on the Ethereum. DApps of the indirect architecture
(Figure 2b) have back-end services running on a centralized
server, and the client interacts with smart contracts through
the server. DApps of the mixed architecture combines the
preceding two architectures where the client interacts with
smart contracts both directly and indirectly through a back-
end server.
Solidity is the programming language for developing smart
contracts in the Ethereum community. It is a JavaScript-like
language, in which there are contracts (like classes), functions
and events. The source code of a smart contract is compiled
into bytecode to be deployed on Ethereum. After deployment,
the smart contract will get an address.
Smart contract deployment. All accounts can deploy smart
contracts. Sometimes developers use a smart contract to deploy
other child contracts. The usage pattern is called ”factory
pattern”, and will be discussed in Section V-B.
Ethereum Blockchain
Smart Contract 1 Smart Contract 2
DApp Client
DApp
(a) Direct.
Ethereum Blockchain
Smart Contract 1
DApp Server
DApp Client
DApp
DApp Service
(b) Indirect.
Ethereum Blockchain
Smart 
Contract 1
Smart 
Contract 2
DApp Server
DApp Client
DApp
DApp Service
(c) Mixed.
Fig. 2: Three kinds of DApp architectures.
Cost of smart contracts. As mentioned above, accounts
have to pay gas for every transaction. Cost of a smart contract
consists two parts: deployment and contract execution. The
deployment of a smart contract can be seen as a contract
execution of calling a special function constructor(). In this
paper, we separate the deployment cost out of the general
execution cost to study the two kinds of costs respectively. The
deployment cost can represent the complexity of the contract.
Since executions are uniformly encoded in transactions, and
finally packed into blocks, total gas sent in transactions of a
block is limited. So, a contract execution that costs more gas
than the limit will fail and change nothing.
III. THE DATASET
In this section, we introduce the dataset that we collect to
conduct our empirical study.
Since there is no official app marketplace for blockchain-
based DApps like App Store for iOS apps or Google Play for
Android apps, we resort to third-party collections of DApps.
Specifically, we choose DApps from State of the DApps [28],
which is a privately funded and independent website that
collects DApps from major blockchain systems. Established in
2017, State of the DApps has grown to be the main directory of
DApps where DApp developers can submit their DApps to get
published. It is also worth to mention that State of the DApps is
referenced by the official homepage of Ethereum. So Ethereum
DApps from this site are representative to understand the
whole ecosystem.
We retrieve all the 1,749 Ethereum DApps that can be
found on State of the DApps as of Jan. 2019. For each DApp,
we collect the following information.
• Basic information of the DApp, including the name,
the category it belongs to, and the first publishing time.
• Smart contracts which the DApp consists of. State of
the DApps allows developers to specify the addresses
of smart contracts that the published DApp consists
of. Therefore, we can retrieve such information for
some DApps. Then, we try to obtain the source code
of each smart contract on Etherscan [30], which is a
block explorer and analytic platform of Ethereum where
developers can submit the source code of their smart
contracts.
• Transactions related to the DApp. We get blocks sub-
mitted in 2018 from Ethereum blockchain, and retrieve
related contract executions in these blocks by checking
addresses of participants. For each transaction, we extract
addresses of senders and receivers, gas sent, input data,
status (whether the contract execution succeeds) and how
many Ethers transferred. Related internal transactions and
gas used of external transactions are extracted by simu-
lated executions, and double checked by being compared
with results from Etherscan.
TABLE I: Statistics of the dataset used in the empirical study.
DApps 995
Smart contracts 5,158
Open-source smart contracts 2,568
Transactions 29,846,075
User Accounts 2,199,059
Transaction volume (ETH) 9,057,344.360
In order to deeply investigate how DApps utilize the capa-
bilities provided by the blockchain, we filter those DApps that
developers do not provide the addresses of smart contracts for.
Because we cannot retrieve smart contracts just by DApps’
information and analyze how they work. After filtering, our
dataset has 995 DApps left, which are used for the study in the
following sections. Table I shows the statistics of our dataset.
We get 5,158 smart contracts from lists that DApps provide,
among which 2,568 contracts’ source code can be retrieved.
There are 29,846,075 related transactions initiated in 2018, by
which 2,199,059 user accounts transfer 9,057,344,360 Ethers.
IV. POPULARITY OF DAPPS
In this section, we try to describe an overview of the
Ethereum DApp market, and answer RQ1, i.e., how is the
popularity of DApps distributed? We first study the popular-
ity by some metrics, and then compare DApps in different
categories. Finally, we examine the growth of the number of
DApps as time evolves.
A. DApp Distribution
We use three metrics to measure the popularity of DApps:
(1) the number of unique addresses (user accounts); (2) the
number of transactions; (3) the amount of transaction volume
(in ETH).
1) Popularity by Users: We extract all the user accounts
occurred in the transactions of a DApp as the number of users
that the DApp has.
Figure 3a shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the percentage of DApp users against the DApp ranking by
transactions. We can see that the DApp users follow the Pareto
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(b) Users of a DApp.
Fig. 3: DApp popularity by users.
principle, i.e. less than 20% of DApps have almost all users.
We can conclude that the more a DApp is used, the more users
it has.
We also explore the distribution of users of each DApp.
Figure 3b indicates that about 80% of DApps are used by
only less than 1000 users.
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(b) Transactions of a DApp.
Fig. 4: DApp popularity by transactions.
2) Popularity by Transactions: Because all transactions are
added to the block with paying gas, transactions can be seen as
real behaviours of users. Figure 4a shows that the CDF of the
percentage of transactions of DApps against DApp ranking by
transactions. We can find that a few (about 5%) DApps have
80% of transactions. It follows the Pareto principle as well.
Figure 4b shows that over 80% of DApps have less than
10,000 transactions. Such findings indicate a ”long-tail” of
DApps that are rarely active.
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(b) Transaction volume of a DApp.
Fig. 5: DApp popularity by ETH trade.
3) Popularity by Transaction Volumes: In Ethereum, each
transaction needs to pay gas, charged by Ethers, to miners,
but they can transfer 0 Ether. Therefore, DApps having many
transactions may not be economic beneficial. So we study the
actual transaction volume of DApps. Figure 5a illustrate the
CDF of the percentage of DApps’ transaction volumes against
the DApp rank. We can find that the Pareto principle also holds
for DApp transaction volumes.
Figure 5b shows that about 60% of DApps have only less
than 10 Ethers (about 6,000 dollars in 2018) a year. 27.25%
of DApps get few Ethers.
B. DApp Category
In State of the DApps, DApps are divided into 17 cate-
gories: Exchanges, Games, Finance, Gambling, Development,
Storage, High-risk, Wallet, Governance, Property, Identity,
Media, Social, Security, Energy, Insurance and Health. The
categorization is similar to that of mobile apps in Google Play
[35], but simpler and rougher.
Some categories are not used to categorize mobile apps,
such as Finance and Exchanges, which are two typical cate-
gories of DApps. Because of the financial feature of Ethereum,
cryptocurrencies (category Finance), cryptocurrency manage-
ment services (category Wallet) and cryptocurrency markets
(category Exchanges) are hot. Recently, smart contracts are
used in gambling (category Gambling), collectible card games
and gambling games (category Games).
DApps from category Property are marketplaces and ser-
vices for other products, like software. In other categories,
DApps claim they provide distributed or decentralized services
to meet users’ requirements.
DApps from category Development claim that they provide
services to help to use distributed computing services of
blockchain and develop smart contracts and DApps. Category
Storage is used to mark DApps that provide decentralized
storage services, Compared with similar mobile apps, decen-
tralization and robustness is placed on them.
High-risk seems to be a tag rather than a category. Ac-
cording to [25], there are over 400 Ponzi schemes running
on Ethereum. Therefore, category High-risk marks DApps in
which users may take high-risk, like investment traps and
Ponzi Scheme games.
Table II shows the popularity of DApps among different
categories. We can find that category Games has the most
DApps (29.5%) but 8.4% of users (7th), the second most
(19.5%) transactions and 2.5% of transaction volume (5th).
DApps of this category have become a hot topic in Ethereum
DApp market. Category Exchanges and Finance have many
users (35.4% and 23.5%) and high ratio of transaction vol-
ume (61.5% and 25.6%). These DApps have great influence.
Category Identity, Media, Social, Security, Energy, Insurance
and Health have fewer users and transactions. They represent
new designs of DApps, but their practicability still need
verification.
C. Growth over Time
Figure 6a shows how the number of DApps grew over
time before Jan. 1st, 2019. In our dataset, the first DApp
was published at April 22, 2015. The number of DApps grew
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(b) Growth of DApps from category Exchanges, Games, Finance, Gambling,
Development and High-risk.
Fig. 6: DApps’ growth over time.
significantly from May 2017. After Feb. 2018, more DApps
were published every day.
Figure 6b shows the growth of DApps of top six categories
ranked by transactions. DApps from category Development
and Finance were first published. At the beginning, all cate-
gories had similar trends. After May 16, 2017, the numbers
of DApps from category Exchanges, Games, Gambling and
Finance grew rapidly. In Feb. 2018, category Games had
similar number with category Exchanges and Finance, then
grew over the other two and led to the significant growth of
the number of all DApps.
The first DApp from category High-risk appeared in May
2017. In Feb. 2018, the number of DApps of High-risk grew
more rapidly, of which the trend was similar with category
Gambling’s. At Dec 31st, 2018, there were 154 Gambling
DApps and 130 High-risk DApps in Ethereum DApp market.
So, we can conclude that DApps from category Exchanges
and Finance were hot early, and then DApps with the financial
feature like gambling games grew rapidly. But at the same
time, high-risk DApps also became more and more.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF DAPPS
In this section, we dig deeply into DApps and the cor-
responding smart contracts to answer RQ2, i.e., are there
any common practices of developing DApps? We first study
whether DApps are open source, being able to be audited by
any blockchain participant. Then we investigate how develop-
ers implement smart contracts to support DApps.
A. Open Source
As illustrated in Figure 2, a DApp can be divided into two
parts: on-chain part where smart contracts are implemented
to use the capability of blockchains, and off-chain part where
traditional programs are implemented to provide services to
end-users. Thus, we study two levels of open source of DApps:
contract level (on-chain) and project level (off-chain).
TABLE II: DApp popularity by categories.
(Categories are sorted by Transactions)
Category DApps Users Transactions Transaction Volume# % # % # % # %
Exchanges 71 7.1% 778,031 35.4% 13,708,713 45.9% 5,570,026.10 61.5%
Games 294 29.5% 184,730 8.4% 5,834,574 19.5% 226,506.11 2.5%
Finance 93 9.3% 517,525 23.5% 2,571,729 8.6% 2,321,199.88 25.6%
Gambling 154 15.5% 77,790 3.5% 1,781,856 6.0% 448,476.51 5.0%
Development 30 3.0% 269,821 12.3% 1,154,346 3.9% 20,525.36 0.2%
Storage 13 1.3% 249,544 11.3% 1,031,779 3.5% 11.29 0.0%
High-risk 130 13.1% 47,186 2.1% 965,131 3.2% 370,543.94 4.1%
Wallet 17 1.7% 193,790 8.8% 787,160 2.6% 2,020.50 0.0%
Governance 18 1.8% 188,201 8.6% 633,211 2.1% 132.29 0.0%
Property 24 2.4% 46,707 2.1% 485,341 1.6% 47,421.00 0.5%
Identity 12 1.2% 82,251 3.7% 425,860 1.4% 5,330.45 0.1%
Media 48 4.8% 127,315 5.8% 403,055 1.4% 1,144.43 0.0%
Social 72 7.2% 88,355 4.0% 381,534 1.3% 10,065.19 0.1%
Security 14 1.4% 40,684 1.9% 127,550 0.4% 17,211.19 0.2%
Energy 3 0.3% 21,312 1.0% 95,025 0.3% 22,127.17 0.2%
Insurance 1 0.1% 5,755 0.3% 19,575 0.1% 0.52 0.0%
Health 2 0.2% 4 0.0% 9 0.0% 0.00 0.0%
All DApps 995 2,199,059 29,846,075 9,057,344.36
Although all smart contracts can be directly retrieved from
the blockchain, they are only in the form of bytecode which
is not readable. In practice, developers can submit the source
code of smart contracts to block explorers or open-source code
repositories. For the other parts of DApps, they can be open
source through classical open-source channels, like GitHub.
According to whether DApps are open source at the contract
level and the project level, there are 6 categories of the open-
source degree of DApps, as shown in Table III. Note that
smart contracts may be partially open source, meaning that
developers submit the source code of only part of smart
contracts consisting of a DApp.
TABLE III: Categories of the open-source degree of DApps.
The DApp project
is open source
The DApp project
isnot open source
Smart contracts
are all open source GA NA
A part of smart contracts
are open source GP NP
Smart contract
are all closed source GC NC
15.7%
2.1%
27.3%
27.8%
2.1%
25%
GA
GP
GC
NA
NP
NC
Fig. 7: Percentage of open-
source DApps.
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Figure 7 depicts the percentage of DApps in each open-
source category. Only 15.7% of DApps are fully open source,
and 25.0% of DApps are fully closed source. 54.9% of DApps
do not make them project-level open-source, meaning that they
hide their business-related code. As for the contract-level open
source, we can observe that there are 43.5% of DApps whose
smart contracts are all open source. This result implies that
developers tend to share the code of smart contracts rather
than the DApps.
Then we analyze the relationship between open source
and popularity of DApps. Figure 8 depicts the distribution
of the number of transactions among different open-source
categories. We can find that DApps whose smart contracts
are all closed source have smaller number of transactions.
DApps whose smart contracts are all open source have higher
maximum transactions. Therefore, we can conclude that the
open source of smart contracts may improve the DApps’
popularity.
B. Usage Patterns of Smart Contracts
Developers use smart contracts to keep data on the chain and
do some operations. Sometimes the operations are too complex
to be done by one smart contract, so that developers implement
multiple smart contracts for a single DApp. Figure 9 shows
the distribution of the number of smart contracts per DApp.
We can find that over 75% (757) of DApps are supported by
one smart contract. We denote these DApps as single-contract
DApps.
About 25% of DApps are supported by multiple smart
contracts (denoted as multi-contract DApps), and almost all
of them have less than 10 smart contracts. In the median case,
a multi-contract DApp has 3 smart contracts. The maximum
number of smart contracts of a DApp is 1881.
Considering features of smart contracts, we select two met-
rics to classify the usage patterns of smart contracts in multi-
contract DApps: internal transactions among smart contracts
and smart contract deployers. As shown in Table IV, we divide
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Fig. 9: Distribution of the number of smart contracts per DApp.
TABLE IV: Classification of usage patterns of smart contracts.
Deployed by
user accounts
Deployed by
smart contract
accounts
There are
internal transactions Leader-Member Pattern NA
There are no
internal transactions Equivalent Pattern Factory Pattern
the smart contract usages into three patterns. Smart contract
management in these patterns are illustrated in Figure 10.
Internal transactions indicate that there is dependence among
smart contracts. But internal transactions initiated by smart
contracts generated by smart-contract accounts are used to
return Ether to their deployers where they have no dependence
in functionality. So, we do not need to create a category to
describe this usage pattern.
Leader-member pattern. In the leader-member pattern, a
contract execution starts in a smart contract. Then the entry
smart contract (the leader) initiates internal transactions to
other smart contracts (members). Therefore, in the leader-
member pattern, contract executions usually have more deeper
call stacks. For a example, developers design smart contracts
S, A, B, C, and set S as the entry contract. In a possible path,
S is executed first, and then it sends internal transactions to A,
B, C in order. So, S is the leader, A, B and C are members,
and they form the leader-member pattern.
Equivalent pattern. The equivalent pattern is the simplest
pattern. Developers design smart contracts separately, make
them handle contract executions, and combine their func-
tions in clients and/or servers. By only transactions on the
blockchain, we cannot find dependence among them. Like
smart contract A, B, C deployed by different deployers, they
don’t send internal transactions to each other. But they support
the DApp together.
Factory pattern. In this pattern, a deployer deploys a smart
contract and then make it deploy similar contracts to receive
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Fig. 10: Usage patterns of smart contracts.
contract executions from user accounts. The process is like a
factory producing products, so we call the pattern ”factory
pattern”. The smart contract deployed first is the ”factory
contract”, and smart contracts generated by the factory contract
are called ”child contracts”. Figure 10 shows a case: deployer
deploy smart contract A first, and make it deploy A1, A2,
A3. Then the three child contracts are able to be executed.
Developers using the factory pattern can keep child contracts
similar. This pattern is usually used in DApps from the
category Gambling, whose developers use the factory contract
to generate games with the same rules.
By checking internal transactions and deployers of smart
contracts, we find leader-member pattern in 194 DApps and
199 smart contracts, equivalent pattern in 214 DApps and
1,539 smart contracts, and factory pattern in 28 DApps and
2,671 smart contracts. The leader-member pattern is not
widely used. Developers are more likely to design independent
smart contracts in functionality.
VI. COST OF SMART CONTRACTS IN DAPPS
The cost of smart contracts in DApps includes two parts:
deployment cost and execution cost. Deployments and execu-
tions are done as transactions, which cost gas. Gas are paid
with Ethers, and the amount of gas used is a measurement of
the complexity of a contract execution. An account sends some
gas in a contract execution, and then gets the gas left when the
contract execution is confirmed. If the transaction has used all
the gas sent from the initiator, the account receives an error
information ”out of gas” and lose all gas it sends.
To lower the costs of deployments and executions is impor-
tant. In Ethereum blockchain, total gas of a block is limited. A
complex smart contract may cost too much gas so that it cannot
be deployed, i.e., the block will not contain the transaction.
In addition, the higher the contract execution costs are, the
lower the throughput of contract executions, and the longer
users wait for confirmations of executions.
In this section, we investigate the gas that is actually used
for deploying and executing smart contracts to answer RQ3,
i.e., how much is the cost of DApps when running on the
blockchain? If not specified, in this section, the term “gas”
represents the amount of gas that has been actually used in
the contract execution.
A. Deployment Cost of Smart Contracts
As mentioned above, gas used in deploying a smart contract
reflects the complexity of the contract. We compare the
deployment costs among different usage patterns of smart
contracts to study whether developers can leverage different
patterns to lower the cost of deploying smart contracts. Then
we build a regression model to explore what factors influence
the deployment cost.
1) Deployment Cost of Different Usage Patterns of Smart
Contracts: Figure 11 shows the distribution of smart contract
deployment costs among different usage patterns. In general,
smart contracts of the single pattern cost smaller than others,
meaning that the smart contracts of single-contract DApps are
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Fig. 11: Deployment cost difference among smart contract
usage patterns.
simpler than those of multi-contract DApps. The reason is that
developers of single-contract DApps design limited functions
in smart contracts, and may use back-end servers or relatively
complex clients to implement the DApps.
Smart contracts of leader-member pattern and equivalent
pattern have more deployment cost, meaning that contracts
of these two patterns are more complex. The reason is that
developers need smart contracts to do more operations. They
split functions into multiple smart contracts and make them
co-operate so that they could keep deployment cost of each
smart contract at a low level.
Deployment costs of child contracts of the factory pattern
are more concentrated around a value, because they are
generated by some factory contracts. Child contracts generated
by a certain factory contract have similar deployment costs.
2) Influence Factors: To explore what influences the de-
ployment costs of smart contracts, we extract some features
from smart contracts and their source code, and build a
regression model to check relationships between features and
the deployment cost.
From Etherscan, we can get ABIs (Application Binary
Interface) and source code of smart contracts. The ABI de-
scribes a smart contract, including functions (normal functions
and constructors) and events. The number of functions (NoF
for short) and lines of code (LoC for short) could reflect
the complexity of a smart contract and may influence the
deployment cost.
First, each feature is separately used to build a linear
regression model with deployment cost and do regression
analysis by R [62]. The result is shown in Table V. At the
level of t¡0.01, the deployment cost is obviously related to
these features.
Then we use all features with the deployment cost to do
multiple regression analysis (Table VI). R2 is significantly
higher than results of two linear regression analyses above.
The correlation coefficient of NoF is higher than LoC’s, so we
can conclude that NoF and LoC all influence the deployment
cost, and the deployment cost is more related to NoF.
B. Execution Cost of Smart Contracts
In a contract execution, a user (the caller) sends some gas,
input data and Ethers if they want, to call a function of the
smart contract. Miners receive the transaction and add it into
a block. When checking if the block is valid, miners will
find the transaction and then execute it. They load the smart
contract and its storage, and execute the function. They will
load other smart contracts if the function calls other functions
of other smart contracts, namely create internal transactions.
They count gas for any instructions. If all the gas is used or
another error occurs, miners will stop the execution and mark
the contract execution as ”isError”, meaning some errors in
the execution and the contract execution fails. Unless all gas
is used, gas left will be changed into Ethers and returned to
the caller after the block is added into the chain, namely the
transaction is confirmed.
Therefore, to lower the costs of contract executions, callers
should better send less gas in transactions. Meanwhile, devel-
opers should lower the complexity of contract executions. We
check the gas sent and used in transactions, and explore if
internal transactions and the usage pattern of smart contracts
may influence the execution costs, to find a way to lower the
cost.
1) Gas Sent in Transactions: In practice, end-users interact
with clients, where some operations are translated to contract
executions and sent to smart contracts. Contract executions
(excluding the deployment) represent actual use of smart
contracts. Users (sometimes the DApp maintainers) pay for
them with Ethers. The gas left of a contract execution cannot
be used until the transaction is confirmed. If users want to use
their Ethers more flexibly, they should better send limited but
enough gas.
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Fig. 12: Gas of contract executions.
Figure 12a shows the distribution of number of contract
executions to gas left. We can see that 50% of contract exe-
cutions have 100,000 gas left and 75% of contract executions
have 200,000 gas left. About 5% of contract executions use all
the gas. Such results indicate that over 100,000 gas are locked
in about 50% of contract executions.
In Figure 12b, we can find that 70% of contract executions
cost less than 100,000 gas, and 80% of contract executions
cost less than 141,213 gas. Only about 5% of contract
executions cost over 300,000 gas. So, if users want to request
a contract execution, they can just send 141,213 gas to cover
the cost in 80% of cases.
In the median case, users send 199,366 gas in contract
executions, but only 99,366 gas is used and 100,000 gas left is
locked in contract executions until transactions are confirmed.
2) Contract Executions with Internal Transactions: Internal
transactions also cost gas. Because smart contracts cannot
TABLE V: Result of two linear regression analyses.
Feature Estimate Std. Error Pr(> |t|) Multiple R-squared P-value
NoF 53389 1965 < 2e− 16 0.2956 < 2.2e− 16
LoC 1870 53.86 < 2e− 16 0.4066 < 2.2e− 16
TABLE VI: Result of multiple regression analysis.
(Multiple R-squared: 0.535, P-value: < 2e− 16)
Feature Estimate Std. Error Pr(> |t|)
NoF 37141.26 1685.74 < 2e− 16
LoC 1514.68 50.34 < 2e− 16
actively initiate internal transactions, they are triggered by
external transactions. Internal transactions are included in ex-
ternal transactions that trigger them and the costs are included
in costs of contract executions as well. Thus, for similar
contract executions, those that have internal transactions cost
more gas than others.
Internal transactions are initiated for many reasons, but just
a few of them are in design of DApps. Suppose there are two
DApps, A and B, each of which is a multi-contract DApp.
A smart contract of A is triggered by a contract execution to
initiate an internal transaction to B, and then there are more
internal transactions triggered among smart contracts of B.
Internal transactions among smart contracts of B are not taken
into account for developers of A, and they do not have to think
about them. Therefore, we just consider internal transactions
in DApp designs, which means internal transactions among
smart contracts of DApps.
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Fig. 13: Execution cost difference between contract executions
with and without internal transactions in DApps.
Figure 13 shows difference between the two types of
contract executions. We can find that contract executions with
internal transactions cost more gas than those without internal
transactions.
3) Difference among Smart Contract Usage Patterns: To
compare execution costs of smart contracts among usage
patterns, we have to use a metric to represent the average level
of a smart contract’s execution costs. We select an example
from our dataset to show the distribution of a contract’s
contract executions and their costs.
IDEX [36] is a DApp categorized as Exchanges and has the
most transactions in 2018. The contract selected is one of the
two smart contracts it has. As shown in Figure 14, distributions
of the contract’s execution costs and numbers of invocations
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of functions are uneven. Neither arithmetical mean nor median
can represent the average level.
For each function, gas used of its invocations is concen-
trated. So we take the number of invocations to functions
into account, and define a new metric agas (average gas) to
represent the average level of a smart contract’s execution cost:
agas =
∑
mgasi · counti∑
counti
(1)
mgasi represents gas median of function i, counti repre-
sents the invocation count of function i.
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Fig. 15: Execution cost difference among smart contract usage
patterns.
Then we compare the average gas of smart contracts of four
patterns. According to Figure 15, in general, smart contracts
of leader-member pattern and factory pattern cost more gas in
contract executions. Smart contracts of equivalent pattern have
a similar distribution of agas with those of single pattern.
VII. FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
Based on the results in preceding sections, we summa-
rize the findings of our study and draw implications to the
stakeholders in the ecosystem of blockchain-based DApps, in-
cluding end-users, DApp developers, and blockchain vendors.
Table VII shows all the findings and implications.
VIII. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first compre-
hensive study to understand the blockchain-based DApps. In
this section, we first survey the related work of blockchain
systems, and then introduce literature on P2P applications,
which are the traditional type of DApps.
A. Blockchain Systems
The blockchain has become a hot research field. Researchers
mainly focus on three research directions: the underlying
mechanism, application and data mining.
Underlying mechanism. Underlying Mechanisms include
consensus mechanisms and smart contract mechanisms. Many
consensus mechanisms are proposed, such as PoW (Proof of
Work) [4], PoS (Proof of Stake) [9], DPoS (Delegated Proof
of Stake) [8], and Algorand [12] recently presented. Some
classical consistency algorithms like PBFT [10] (practical
byzantine fault tolerance) are used as well. Furthermore, a
few researchers make performance monitoring [37], [38] and
try to improve existing mechanisms [11], [45]. Smart contract
mechanisms attract experts of software engineering [13], [14]
and security [15], [40], [50].
Blockchain application. For its decentralization, per-
sistency, anonymity and auditability, blockchain can be
used in anonymous trading, persistence services and cross-
organizational transactions. So blockchain technology has
been widely used in finance service [16], IoT (Internet of
Things) [17]–[19], information security [20], [21], edge com-
puting [39] and software engineering [13].
Data mining. Thanks to the public accessibility and au-
ditability of blockchain, researchers can do analysis based
on transaction data for usage characteristics [23], [24], [73]
and so on. The other accessible data are smart contracts, for
example, their bytecode written in the blocks. There are some
work analyzing these code to give advises for smart contract
developers and blockchain users [25], [26], [46]. Researchers
also try to decompile them into source code [47] so that more
approaches to source code analysis can be used.
B. Peer-to-peer Applications
Traditional DApps refer to applications on the P2P network
[3], on which there are lots of research efforts, including
security, performance and application.
Security. Security of P2P network and applications includes
two parts: security of P2P network and possible harmful
behaviours of users. For security of P2P network, researchers
detect attacks [72], use other technologies like trusted com-
puting [71] and design new protocols [70]. Some harmful
behaviours in P2P applications are found as well [55], [56].
Performance. P2P applications are likely to become the
burden of local network, especially P2P file sharing systems.
Researchers monitor the performance [53], [54], [67], and try
to improve these applications by optimizing application layer
[58], [64], [66] and network layer [69].
Application. P2P technology is widely used in many fields,
such as instant messaging [6], file sharing system [51], devel-
opment [44], security [43] and so on.
Cryptocurrencies, for example Bitcoin, are applications
based on P2P networks as well. From 2009, more and more
cryptocurrencies are issued, which leads to the growth of
blockchain technology, especially public blockchain technol-
ogy. According to CoinMarketCap [63], nowadays there are
over 2,000 cryptocurrencies in the world.
Few researches are about blockchain-based DApps, but
these DApps have great influence on the blockchains on which
they run. Some work has been performed to help developers
develop Blockchain-based DApps [52].
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The scale of DApp market is rapidly growing and has
reached billions of dollars. In this study, we conducted a
systematic descriptive analysis of 995 DApps over Ethereum.
We analyzed the popularity of DApps, the development prac-
tices of DApps, and the cost of running DApps. Our findings
provided valuable implications for different stakeholders in the
ecosystem of blockchain-based DApps, including end-users,
DApp developers and blockchain vendors.
This paper mainly focused on the descriptive analysis of
DApps’ transaction data. In our future work, we plan to study
how to develop a high-quality DApp by deeply investigating
the source code of DApps. Some questions needed to be
further explored, such as how to build a DApp project, how to
keep synchronization on and off the chain, and how to improve
the throughput of DApps. The answer of these questions
can directly improve the development of DApps and benefit
millions of users.
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